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• In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract
deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget
(1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of
large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe reces-
sions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability.
• The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are:
unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from
potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The
common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral,
avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient
size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output
from potential appears to be the best option.
• A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could
address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank
resolution authority.
• Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for sta-
bilisation policy and financial stability.
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1. See Box 1 of Pisani-Ferry
et al (2012).
2. The so-called six-pack
and two-pack; see
http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/articles/gover-
nance/2012-03-14_six_pack
_en.htm.
3. See the interim report
Towards a Genuine Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union
by the President of the
European Council, which
identifies the need for a
“fiscal capacity for the
EMU”, which would have to
go beyond the EU budget.
The interim report is avail-
able at http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/
132809.pdf.
1 WHY IS A EURO-AREA BUDGET NEEDED?
Federations typically have sizeable federal
budgets and exercise important functions at the
federal level. In the US, federal spending accounts
for 68 percent of total government spending, in
Switzerland it is 32 percent, though Switzerland is
an outlier in terms of sub-national level
expenditure. Typically, central governments in
federations control more than 50 percent of the
total expenditure size (Table 1).
The largest part of federal budgets typically goes
to social welfare (Figure 1). But other functions are
also assigned to the federal level. Banking policy,
for example, is typically organised at the federal
level1. A central element of a well-designed
banking union is clear organisation of the fiscal
resources that may need to be called on (Pisani-
Ferry and Wolff, 2012).
The European Union is different of course. It has a
small budget relative to the size of the EU
economy, and creditor countries are unwilling to
increase it. The EU is not a federation, but it does
have common fiscal rules2 that have arisen
because of monetary union, and there have been
calls for a more integrated budgetary framework
to facilitate the absorption of country specific
shocks by providing for some absorption at the
central level. The president of the European
Council has sketched out some proposals in a
paper jointly prepared with the president of the
European Commission, the European Central Bank
and the Eurogroup3. Moreover, the currently
discussed fiscal capacity should promote
structural reforms and improve competitiveness,
though it should not lead to permanent transfers
nor undermine incentives to address structural
weaknesses and stick to fiscal discipline.
Moreover, it would have the possibility to borrow
based on a balanced budget rule.
So what would a euro-area budget look like? The
theory of fiscal federalism provides a starting
point. Stabilisation policy essentially needs to be
exercised at the federal level (Oates, 1968)
because it cannot be exercised effectively at the
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Figure 1: Federal spending by task
Source: Bruegel based on Swiss Confederation Federal Depart-
ment of Finance and US Office of Management and Budget.
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Argentina No 46.2 18 4
USA Yes, enforced 45.2 34.4 3
Germany Yes, but weak 43.7 29.2 2.5
Brazil No 42.8 28 4.5
Switzerland Yes, enforced 63.5 40.8 3
Canada Yes 72.7 44 2.7
Australia No 45.3 30.8 2.5
India No 49 33 2.5
Table 1: Features of fiscal federations
Sources and notes: * Bordo and Markiewicz (2012); ** IMF,
GMS, expenditure decentralisation: sub-national expendi-
tures/total expenditures; † OECD, Blöchliger, H. and J. Rabes-
ona (2009), Rodden (2004), state local tax rev/total rev. ††
Borrowing autonomy: the index of borrowing autonomy has
been constructed by the Inter-American Development Bank.
It considers debt authorisation requirements and limits on
the use of debt imposed by the central government. This vari-
able ranges from 1 to 5. See Rodden (2006) for details.
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ically equity markets, stabilise regional shocks if
the ownership of equity is not regionally concen-
trated. A negative shock to a region would thus
lead to losses in the entire federation, reducing the
impact on income and consumption in the region.
Credit markets can also play an important stabili-
sation function if households, corporations and
governments can borrow outside of the region. The
limits to this function are set by the degree of inte-
gration of the credit market and the limits on bor-
rowing given expected regional income. Empirical
studies find that almost 40 percent of shocks are
absorbed by capital markets, about 25 percent by
credit markets and only 10-20 percent by the fed-
eral budget (see Box 1).
Stabilisation in the euro area
It is worth pondering how the different channels
of risk sharing might work at euro-area level. The
credit channel can only be effective if there is no
4. Keynes (1929).
5. There are other smaller
effects from other sources,
which is why the high-
lighted items do not add up
to 13 percent.
sub-federal level. In fact, deficit-financed sub-fed-
eral government spending will require regional
government to be willing and able to place debt
externally. Regional governments have to treat
deficit financing with much greater care than cen-
tral governments because the eventual repay-
ment of local debt and interest will represent a
transfer of income to outsiders. The transfer has
to be paid in a currency that is not controlled by
the regional government. External payments are
compounded by the well known transfer problem
identified by Keynes4: to be able to repay external
debt, the prices of export goods need to adjust in
order to generate a trade surplus. This price adjust-
ment represents a negative terms-of-trade shock,
making external payments much more difficult.
Federal budgets are therefore used for stabilisa-
tion. Yet, capital and credit markets may play an
even more important role in stabilisation of
regional shocks. Capital markets and more specif-
BOX 1: STABILISATION OF REGIONAL SHOCKS
Various studies that have estimated the scope of income smoothing in response to regional shocks
in other monetary unions. The seminal contribution to this literature is Asdrubali et al (1996), who
studied risk sharing among US states, 1963-1990. The authors identify three channels of risk sharing:
(i) cross-ownership of capital assets, which allows states to smooth income through factor income
flows; (ii) smoothing by federal government via taxes and transfers vis-à-vis individuals and regions;
(iii) smoothing via borrowing from credit markets. They find that in the US 39 percent of shocks are
smoothed by capital markets, 13 percent by the federal government and 23 percent by credit
markets. This leaves 25 percent of the shocks that are unabsorbed by insurance mechanisms. Hepp
and Von Hagen (2010) conducted a similar exercise for Germany and found a greater contribution of
fiscal policy, even though significant parts of it have distributional effects. Mélitz and Zumer (2002)
provide an overview of studies focusing on the federal budget’s stabilisation role. For the US, the
different estimates range from 10-40 percent with the high end found in Sala-i-Martin & Sachs (1991),
even though doubts about the latter study have been voiced. Mélitz and Zumer (2002) themselves
find that federal government absorbs around 20 percent of regional shocks to personal income in
the US, the United Kingdom and France, while the share is lower at 13 percent in Canada. An important
methodological problem of the studies is to properly distinguish between stabilisation and
redistribution or for inappropriate accounting.
How is shock absorption by the US federal government done? Of the total of 13 percent calculated by
Asdrubali et al (1996), taxes account for 4.3 percent, transfers (excluding unemployment insurance)
for 6.3 percent, unemployment insurance for 1.9 percent and grants for 2.5 percent5.
Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2004) show that smoothing via factor income flows has been increasing both
in the US and within the countries now constituting the euro area. In those countries, it rose from 2
percent during 1973-1982 to 9 percent during 1993-2000. Balli et al (2012) use more recent data
and also account for smoothing via capital gains. They find that smoothing from factor income was
at 14 percent during 2000-2007 while smoothing via capital gains contributed another 6 percent.
balance-of-payment constraint. But if
governments, households and corporations find
it difficult to access the credit market, there are
effective constraints to any attempt to smooth out
a negative income shock. Governments are limited
in the extent to which they can stabilise their
economies with deficit financing due to rising risk
premia. These risk premia have been strongly
correlated with the external debt of countries,
forcefully showing the limits of national
stabilisation policy due to balance-of-payment
constraints (see Figure 2)6.
It should be noted that this is really a balance-of-
payment effect. Government debt is not the
primary driver of sovereign bond yields; external
debt has a greater explanatory power (see Figure
3). It is the overall indebtedness of the economy
that matters for the ability of governments to use
fiscal policy as a tool to absorb shocks of
significant magnitude, because unsustainable
private debt often becomes sovereign debt.
The establishment of an EU banking union could
help unclog the credit channel for stabilisation. In
particular, it would allow some decoupling of
corporate and household financing costs from
sovereign financing costs. Thereby, the magnitude
of the cycle would be reduced as the private sector
would not experience major interest rate shocks.
At the same time, proper macro-prudential policy
is needed to prevent credit bubbles in good times.
Moreover, the banking union would reduce
national fiscal costs to some extent.
The capital channel in the euro area for most coun-
tries is currently not a very effective shock absorp-
tion channel. The main reason is that asset holdings
are highly biased towards domestic assets (Figure
4). While the home bias has come down quite a bit
in recent years (Figure 5 on the next page), it is still
strong so that the capital channel can only play a
limited role in smoothing shocks.
6. This is consistent with the
finding of Asdrubali et al
(1996) that credit market
smoothing by US states
decreases when the shock
is more persistent.
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Figure 2: Sovereign bonds 10Y yields vs. net
international investment position (% of GDP)
Source: Bruegel based on Datastream and Eurostat. The
explanatory power is high with (R2=-0.85).
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Figure 3: Sovereign bonds 10Y yields vs.
debt/GDP (%)
Source: Bruegel based on Datastream and Eurostat. The
explanatory power is lower with (R2=0.47).
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Figure 4: Domestic equity in total euro-area
equity holdings
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank data on stock market
capitalisation and IMF CPIS data on cross-border holdings
following the methodology of Balta and Delgado (2009).
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The original idea of the Maastricht Treaty, which
established the EU single currency, was that fiscal
stabilisation would be exercised only at the
national level. The assumption was that
governments would be able to borrow on the
market to smooth national shocks. A federal
transfer system was not foreseen so no fiscal risk
sharing was considered. The assumption was that
the credit market would work and would allow for
sufficient risk sharing. A 3 percent deficit limit was
judged to be generally sufficient for automatic
stabilisers to operate and address all possible
shocks.
Figures 2 and 3 show the fallacy of this Maastricht
assumption. Credit markets can dry up leaving no
tools for macroeconomic stabilisation policy for
the affected countries. Credit markets tend to dry
up in those regions that have large external debt
positions. Yet it is exactly those regions that face
major recessions as a result of major deleveraging
(Koo 2011). The balance sheet adjustment
process in the corporate sector or household
sector often happens in response to a debt
overhang (Ruscher and Wolff, 2012), which in the
experience of the euro area was the domestic
counterpart to the external indebtedness of entire
economies. Effectively, regional governments in
a monetary union cannot provide a fiscal
response to large and deep balance-sheet
recessions because of the unwillingness of
investors to finance external debt. National fiscal
policy becomes ineffective (Fahri and Werning,
2012). Monetary policy, by definition, does not
address deep recessions that are purely regional.
Addressing area-wide shocks
In case of area-wide shocks, stabilisation policy
should also be exercised by the federal budget. A
shock occurring simultaneously in all regional
economies of the federation tends to be
inadequately addressed by regional
governments. The main reason for this is that
regional governments will tend to provide too little
response in the hope that they can free ride on the
fiscal response of their neighbours. Unless there
are very strong coordination mechanisms,
regional fiscal policy will thus be weaker than a
centrally provided stimulus. Evidently, monetary
policy has an important role to play in addressing
area-wide shocks, and is presently the only euro-
area wide stabilisation instrument. Yet, monetary
policy is only an incomplete answer to a very
severe shock, in particular when the lower zero
bound is reached and the scope for quantitative
easing is limited. In such circumstances, the fiscal
multiplier increases (De Long and Summers
2012)7. Federal stabilisation requires a federal
borrowing capacity.
Another very important function of a federal
budget is to provide federal public goods8. In the
euro area, these would be few. Most public goods
such as ecological goods or security at the bor-
ders, would qualify as public goods for the EU
rather than the euro area. Foreign policy may be
appropriate, but to date policy preferences are still
far too heterogeneous. Some more common
efforts in research and education systems would
be warranted but there again non-euro area coun-
tries should participate. Perhaps the most impor-
tant are financial stability and price stability. Price
stability is already provided by the common cen-
tral bank. For the emerging banking union, there
is a need to agree on fiscal burden sharing (Pisani-
Ferry and Wolff 2012). Taking the US example, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is respon-
sible and has significant own resources to over-
come crisis. Yet, the US Treasury stands behind
7. Moreover, fiscal policy,
while slower in
implementing, has faster
effects on activity once it is
implemented. Relying on
monetary policy alone to
address area wide shocks
therefore does not seem to
be sufficient.
8. In principle, a central pro-
visioning of public goods
has the benefit of scale
economies and externali-
ties are taken into account.
At the same time, a central
provisioning of public goods
may not satisfy local differ-
ences in preferences.
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Figure 5: Domestic equity in total euro-area
equity (actual and theoretical) 2010
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank data on stock market
capitalisation and IMF CPIS data on cross-border holdings fol-
lowing the methodology of Balta and Delgado (2009). Note:
Theoretical share of home holdings is equal to the share of
domestic market capitalisation of total euro-area stock
market capitalisation.
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the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
provides credibility. One could view a euro-area
budget as the backbone for such a common fiscal
backstop for a new European resolution authority
and fund. Such a fiscal backstop ultimately means
that the federal level has the ability to borrow on
the market. Borrowing ability is necessary in par-
ticular when crises of confidence need to be
addressed, as was the case in 2008.
Banks’ holdings of sovereign debt also have
implications for the fiscal backstop behind the
banking union. The home-bias in sovereign bond
holdings of banks is significant (Merler and Pisani-
Ferry 2012). Banks in southern Europe have
recently bought significant amounts of
government debt, increasing their dependence on
sovereign solvency even further (Figure 6). Banks
have helped finance governments but have
thereby reinforced the deadly embrace between
banks and sovereigns. A banking union in such a
deadly embrace essentially becomes a fiscal
union. To avoid the sharing of risk resulting from
national debt would require national debt to be
held less by national banking systems.
Fiscal federalism theory also contends that
distribution functions need to be exercised at the
federal level because of the mobility of labour and
capital, which render local distribution attempts
largely ineffective. In the euro area, this is
arguably less the case because mobility is more
limited than in national federations and there is no
political acceptance of redistributive policies
across countries.
To summarise, a monetary union like the euro area
requires a common budget in order to (1) provide
a temporary but significant transfer of resources in
case of large regional shocks to the negatively
affected regions, (2) have an instrument to
counteract severe recessions in the area as a
whole in situations in which monetary policy is
less powerful and fiscal policy becomes more
powerful, and (3) provide public goods for the area
as a whole, which in the euro area is primarily
financial stability.
2 EURO-AREA FISCAL CAPACITY: THE OPTIONS
How should a euro-area budget be structured and
organised? A number of points need to be
considered.
First, in the euro area, the principle of distribu-
tional neutrality should hold. Distributional neu-
trality could be defined as no net transfer over a
certain period. This would be a model in which the
federal budget would result in net transfers to a
negatively-affected country over a number of
years, but after some years those transfers would
be offset. Continuous contributions from the
affected country to the federal budget will mean
that over the long run, the net received payments
are zero, assuming that country specific shocks
are random. An alternative definition of distribu-
tional neutrality would consider the euro-area
budget as a form of insurance for countries in case
of a negative shock. The contributions to the fed-
eral budget would then depend on the likelihood of
a shock. In case a shock occurs, the insurance
would be triggered and a net transfer of resources
would take place. The two models essentially con-
verge to the same result in the very long run.
A second important question is how revenues for
the euro-area budget should be organised. The
organisation of revenues is important both for
distributional neutrality and for the economic
performance of the area. Moreover, depending on
what the insurance is used for, different resources
should be contemplated. Revenues could come
from national budgets or there could be a specific
European tax. A further issue is if the revenue itself
should be used as a stabilisation instrument.
Ideally, revenues would be linked to income or
consumption. Richer countries certainly need to
A BUDGET FOR EUROPE’S MONETARY UNION Guntram B. Wolff
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Figure 6: Bank holdings of euro-area general
government securities, 2004-12
Source: Bruegel based on ECB, MFI balance sheets.
pay more than poorer countries, b ecause rich
countries would require more support in case of a
major shock. Contributions on a per capita basis
therefore do not seem warranted. If revenues are
used to insure the financial system, then
revenues should be related to the size of the
financial sector or the amount of financial
transactions. The financial sector itself should
provide these resources for reasons of political
acceptability, fairness and because it is an
insurance against risks created by the sector itself
(too big to fail).
A third important point concerns the reasons for
support payment. The basic logic of Maastricht
was to keep a balanced budget, thereby giving
ample room to national governments to counter-
act recessions. The current crisis shows the limits
of that logic. Severe balance-sheet recessions
such as those observed in Spain, drive govern-
ments with balanced budgets before the reces-
sion towards insolvency. It is for such large
recessions that outside support is needed. This
support needs to take the form of temporary but
real transfers. For smaller deviations from poten-
tial, a well-established national balanced budget
rule is sufficient. Creating a euro-area budget to
address small shocks does not appear warranted. 
Support for countries affected by asymmetric
business cycle shocks should also be used to
foster structural change. Support payments often
have the tendency to prolong or prevent adjust-
ment to shocks. It is therefore important to con-
ceive the funds in a way to promote change. This
is a major challenge, as can be seen from the con-
tinuous dependence of some regions on support
in existing federations such as Italy, Germany, Bel-
gium and others. Greece has received large trans-
fers from the EU since it became a member in
1981, but structural reforms have been insuffi-
ciently implemented and have contributed to loss
of competitiveness and to current account
deficits, culminating in the Greek crisis of April
2010. To enforce structural adjustment, it would
therefore be best to closely link support from the
euro-area budget to structural reform, as is cur-
rently done in programme countries.
Should the spending of the euro-area budget be
automatic or based on discretion? Automatic
stabilisers can be agreed on ex-ante and therefore
have the advantage of being easily enforceable in
case of a shock. They respond quickly and
automatically to changing external conditions.
Automatic stabilisers would therefore be the best
instrument to be used when one intends to create
an insurance system with clear ex-ante rules.
Discretionary spending requires a strong decision-
making centre that would be able to take
decisions quickly in favour of countries in need.
At the same time, this decision making centre
would need to be clearly controlled by rules and
independent watch-dogs to avoid misspending.
Discretionary spending is desirable to address
specific shocks in a targeted way.
A further consideration is whether the stabilisation
would come from federal spending on common
goods or whether spending will remain national.
Federations typically organise stabilisation using
federal spending. However, the euro area is
different and already has large spending with
national budgets. Increasing federal spending
would mean that national spending would have to
be reduced. A common unemployment insurance
system would be an attempt to shift spending to
the federal level. The alternative is to keep
spending at a national level but essentially
provide federal support to the budget. These two
options are described in more detail below. 
A final consideration is whether the budget should
be a euro-area budget only or whether it should be
open to countries outside the euro area. In
principle, balance-of-payment crisis as described
above are also of relevance to non-euro area
countries with a fixed exchange rate to the euro.
Also, the banking union should allow for non-euro
area members to participate and a similar fiscal
backstop may prevent competitive distortions.
Ideally, the common budget should thus be euro
Guntram B. Wolff  A BUDGET FOR EUROPE’S MONETARY UNION
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‘Support for countries affected by asymmetric shocks should also be used to foster structural
change. Support payments can prolong or prevent adjustment to shocks. It is therefore
important to conceive the funds in a way to promote change. This is a major challenge.’
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area plus all EU countries willing to join the euro
which already have a fixed exchange rate and are
in the ERM II (Exchange Rate Mechanism) thus
preparing themselves for euro membership.
Against this background, a number of instruments
can be considered.
2.1 Unemployment insurance
In many federations, unemployment insurance
plays an important role in the federal budget.
Unemployment insurance has major advantages
in terms of stabilisation policy. Contributions to
the insurance and to the unemployed happen
quickly and automatically.
However, there are significant disadvantages. First
of all, unemployment insurance systems typically
do not matter in macroeconomic terms for
absorption of regional shocks. Asdrubali et al
(1996) estimate the effect to amount to around
1.9 percent of the shock. Furthermore, designing
a European unemployment insurance system
would be a major task. Labour market institutions
and laws differ widely in euro-area countries (see
Box 2 on the next page). Differences in labour
market regulations and institutions have very
significant implications for the duration and type
of unemployment. Creating a common insurance
scheme will give countries an incentive to shape
their labour market regulations in order to
maximise the benefits from the common
resources.
To overcome this incentive problem, it has been
suggested to cover just the first months or first
year of unemployment with EU-financed unem-
ployment insurance. This approach would not
create an incentive to artificially prolong the dura-
tion of unemployment through specific national
labour market institutions. However, a system that
would only cover the first months of unemploy-
ment might not be right instrument to address
long and lasting recessions. Moreover, the dura-
tion of unemployment is very differently distrib-
uted in different member states. Figure 7 (left
panel) shows that unemployment of less than 3
months duration is of different importance in dif-
ferent (selected) euro-area countries. During the
recession, different durations of unemployment
became relatively more important (right panel).
The prerequisite of a common insurance system
that does not have distributional biases would
therefore have to be the harmonisation of euro-
area labour market rules. Otherwise countries with
better job-matching institutions would end up per-
manently supporting countries with more rigid
labour markets.
Overall, it seems that unemployment insurance
would be of limited help to smooth out regional
shocks. It  would be fraught with major incentive
problems and it is unlikely that a common unified
labour market with harmonised labour regulations
and one unemployment insurance scheme is
feasible or even desirable.
2.2 Potential output as a benchmark
A second option for the euro-area budget would be
to link payments into and from the budget to a
measure of the business cycle (for an early analy-
sis see Italianer and Pisani-Ferry, 1992). The idea
would be to complement the Stability and Growth
Pact, which is centred on the budget balance net
of business cycle effects, with a system of finan-
cial support based on the business cycle. Coun-
tries whose output is significantly below potential
output would be allowed to run deficits and would
be supported by common resources. Thereby, the
counter-cyclical reaction could be greater or the
nominal deficit smaller. Operationally, the Euro-
pean Commission could be in charge of determin-
ing potential output and based on this calculation
it would determine the allocation from the
common budget based on a clear rule. The rule
would have to be designed so that large output
gaps would lead to large payments, while small
output gaps would remain a purely national
responsibility. A simple linear rule would probably
not be sufficient; rather, in very significant reces-
sions, much larger payment would be necessary.
The mechanism would be automatically time-lim-
ited because large output gaps are by definition
temporary and neutral over the business cycle.
Long-run dependence on transfers, as in existing
federations, can therefore be avoided.
The biggest advantage of this option is that it
would fit nicely into the existing EU framework and
would allow for counter-cyclical support of
09
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BOX 2: EURO-AREA LABOUR MARKET HETEROGENEITY
Hobijn and Sahin (2007) use OECD unemployment duration data to calculate job finding and job leaving rates for
27 countries. They find that euro-area countries differ substantially in job finding rates but less so in job leaving
rates. Figure 6 uses OECD data to represent the total level of unemployment in selected countries broken down
by duration in 2007 and 2011.
Figure 6: Unemployment by duration in selected euro-area countries, 2007 and 2011
Source: Bruegel based on OECD unemployment data.
Unemployment in Spain and Portugal has increased considerably since 2007. Finland, France and Italy have also
recorded smaller rises. On the other hand, unemployment in Germany has actually decreased.
In addition to stabilisation, any common scheme would, however, also have redistributional effects. These would
depend on whether the scheme would cover only short-term, only long-term, or all unemployment benefits. A
completely unified system would naturally subsidise those countries that have relatively high total unemployment
(if contributions are by worker basis). In both 2007 and 2011, Finland and Spain had relatively many people
unemployed for short durations (<3 months). Consequently, unified insurance for only short-term unemployment
would result in transfers from France, Germany and Portugal to Finland and Spain. On the other hand, Finland had
comparatively low long-term unemployment (>6 months) in both periods. Therefore, unified long-term
unemployment insurance would result in transfers from Finland to the other countries.
The previous differences in outcomes are partly explained by differences in labour market institutions. Table 2
summarises these differences according to the OECD Employment Protection Index (EPI) (2008). According to
theory, higher employment protection increases the cost of both firing and hiring leading to ambiguous effects on
the total unemployment rate (Mortensen & Pissarides 1999). However, Stähler (2007) argues that this result
does not hold in unionised labour markets that are characterised by collective bargaining. In such countries,
including many euro-area states, he finds that higher employment protection leads unambiguously to higher
unemployment. Finally, Blanchard and Portugal (1998) have shown that high employment protection makes
labor markets more sclerotic by increasing unemployment duration.
Table 2: OECD Employment Protection Index 2008 for selected countries
According to the OECD general index, employment protection is smallest in Finland and highest in Spain. France
and Spain stand out in the cost of hiring temporary staff in contrast to the more lenient Finland and Germany.
Another set of regulations that affect labour market outcomes are those concerning unemployment benefits. The
consensus view according to both theory (Mortensen 1977) and evidence (Katz & Meyer 1990) is that unemployment
duration varies positively with the duration of benefits. However, Stovicek and Turrini (2012) show that also other
dimensions of unemployment benefit systems are important. There does not seem to exist one optimal system but there
are different avenues to good labour market outcomes. The crucial issue is that different pieces of the whole fit together.
FIN FRA GER ITA POR SPA
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
FIN FRA GER ITA POR SPA
1 year + 6 months to 1 year 3-6 months 1-3 months Less than 1 month
2007 2011
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Protection of permanent workers
against (individual) dismissal
Regulation on temporary
forms of employment
Specific requirements for
collective dismissal
OECD employment
protection index
Finland 2.38 2.17 2.38 2.29
France 2.60 3.75 2.13 3.0
Germany 2.85 1.96 3.75 2.63
Italy 1.69 2.54 4.88 2.58
Portugal 3.51 2.54 1.88 2.84
Spain 2.38 3.83 3.13 3.11
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significant magnitude. The biggest drawback, as
in the case of the deficit procedure, is the fact that
potential output is a concept that is appealing in
theory but controversial in practice. Linking
financial payments to countries to a non-
observable variable is at least as controversial as
defining fiscal consolidation based on it. Moreover,
there would be little control of how the transfers
would be spent. In fact, countries may find it
useful to use the received resources for purposes
that are not useful in tackling the recession. It is
therefore advisable to link the payments to the
fulfilment of structural reforms. This solution
appears to be the easiest to implement in the
current framework, and has the potential to
meaningfully contribute to the mitigation of large
asymmetric shocks. Moreover, spending and
stabilisation policies would remain national and
no common European stabilisation expenditure
programmes would need to be developed.
Both options 2.1 and 2.2 would be neutral over the
business cycle and prevent permanent transfers.
As such, they could imply payments from rich to
poor countries and vice versa depending on the
state of the business cycle.
2.3 Large spreads
A third approach would be to link direct budget
support to excessive deviations of the interest
rate on sovereign bonds from the average interest
rate. One could consider automatic payments of
50 percent of the spread to the average interest
rate times the allowed 60 percent debt in case of
very large spreads. For example, a country with an
interest rate of 6 percent when the weighted
average interest rate would be 3 percent would
then receive 1.5%*60%=0.9% of its GDP as a
transfer. Countries with below the average interest
rate would pay into the system, thereby reducing
their safe-haven benefits. This would be a direct
way of addressing the problem of countries being
priced out of the market when significant shocks
occur. At the same time, significant pressure
would remain to consolidate public finances and
reduce debt9. The mechanism should only set in
when spreads exceed certain thresholds.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it could
result in relatively permanent transfers. It is also
contestable if politics should start setting interest
rates instead of letting the market operate freely.
An argument in favour is that the same function is
currently implicitly undertaken by the European
Central Bank with the new government bond pur-
chasing programme (OMT – outright monetary
transactions), which implicitly subsidises the bor-
rowing of some affected countries. Exercising the
same function via the common budget would
make explicit the implicit fiscal transfer. It would
reduce the benefits that the benchmark bond, the
German Bund, currently enjoys as a safe-haven
bond. Overall, such a scheme has some advan-
tages, but would create major incentive problems.
2.4 Discretionary ad-hoc spending
A further option would be to make temporary
transfer payments to countries dependent on a
European political decision. The precondition for
this would be a robust European decision-making
process that is able quickly to support countries in
need. The advantage of this approach is that it
would allow for targeted and significant payments
to countries most in need. It is debatable how
much of a ‘political union’ is required for such a
system to work, but the current difficulties relating
to Greece and to the EU budget suggest that even
small net transfers are reasons for long and
inefficient debtates. More federal decision making
with political union therefore appears necessary.
Euro-area stabilisation
To address area-wide shocks, euro-area fiscal
capacity should include the ability to borrow on
the market. Federal borrowing would be used to
stabilise the economy. Yet the question then
would be how to spend the federally borrowed
resources so that they have macroeconomic
effects in the euro area. As there is no clearly
defined federal spending, the federally borrowed
money would be distributed to national budgets.
The national decision-making system would be
left with the choice of how to use the additional
funds. It could make up for the shortfall in
revenues due to the recession, or enable
additional discretionary spending. Federal
borrowing should not be misused. In particular, a
system should not be created in which the new
federal capacity has a deficit bias which would
9. See Marzinotto, Sapir and
Wolff (2011) for an earlier
analysis.
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lead to new ever-increasing ‘federal’ debt.
Therefore, any new borrowing capacity should
have firm limits. One option would be to introduce
a structural balance rule requiring the budget to
be structurally balanced so that debt does not
accumulate. An independent fiscal watch-dog
should control the new federal level. In the
medium run, one could see a gradual evolution
towards a system in which national borrowing
would be replaced by euro-area borrowing. This
would require a new level of institutional
integration.
How large a federal budget is needed?
It is difficult to say precisely how large the EU
federal budget should be. The stabilisation of
purely regional shocks would require perhaps 1
percent of euro-area GDP10. An additional 1 percent
revenue stream would be more than enough to
allow for aggregate stabilisation and for the
backing of the necessary borrowing in case of a
major banking crisis. Overall, a budget of 2 percent
would seem sufficient to support a significant
capacity to fund asymmetric shocks, to give
sufficient credibility to borrow in the market to
address area-wide shocks, and to be a credible
backstop to the common resolution fund.
3 CONCLUSIONS
The creation of a European fiscal capacity is of
major importance for the euro area. Purely
national fiscal stabilisation is insufficient because
countries can be forced out of the market in case
of major shocks and large external debt. Over-
indebted countries such as Spain do not benefit
from national fiscal stabilisation because market
pressure is high. Fiscal consolidation is then a
necessary response to the high market pressure.
Yet, undoubtedly, fiscal support is needed to
address the severe recession and alleviate the
political and social costs of adjustment.
Agreeing on an ex-ante, reasonably automatic
support system will require only a relatively
10. Suppose a quarter of the
euro area is hit by a
negative shock. A 1 percent
aggregate budget would
then be sufficient for a 4
percent support of the crisis
hit countries.
11. Bordo et al (2012)
identify that the fiscal union
requires the right
institutions, including a no-
bailout rule and a debt
restructuring mechanism.
12. Commission President
Barroso in his State of the
Union 2012 refers to the
need for a new Treaty
http://ec.europa.eu/soteu20
12/files/soeu_web.pdf.
‘Purely national fiscal stabilisation is insufficient because countries can be forced out of the
market in case of major shocks and large external debt. Fiscal consolidation is a necessary
response to market pressure but, undoubtedly, fiscal support is needed.’
limited degree of political integration. In fact, it
could be based on rules agreed between
countries, in which countries agree on
contributions ex-ante. Making payments in the
case of large deviations from potential output is
probably the best option in this regard. However,
such a system has the drawback of very limited
flexibility and is therefore unable to react more
effectively to shocks outside the standard norms.
Such a system would also fail to provide for the
democratic legitimacy and control that should be
related to payments of significant size. Moreover,
such a system would be rather unsuited for the
creation of common debt. Certainly, democratic
legitimacy for the backstop for the resolution
authority would need to be developed. Even a
limited budget with automatic stabilisation tools
would require a treaty base. It would have to be
checked whether the current Treaty could provide
a basis for this. Article 352 allows the Union to
adopt measures in areas where the Treaties
currently do not provide necessary powers to
obtain the Treaty objectives. It could therefore
possibly be a suitable treaty base.
A more ambitious European fiscal union is
desirable to improve the functioning of Economic
and Monetary Union. It could consist of a strict no-
borrowing rule at national level, a
centrally-determined deficit for the area as a
whole, and centrally-made political decisions on
the distribution of the deficit across the euro
area11. Such a system would allow for the creation
of a federal euro-area debt. A new system would
need to be based on a new Treaty. In the run-up to
the Treaty change envisaged by some12 for 2015,
the discussion on the future fiscal union needs to
start in earnest now.
Finally, a clear distinction should be made
between the system for the long-run and the
solution to today’s most pressing problems. The
current debt overhang and adjustment challenge
is enormous. It may require more ad-hoc debt
restructuring and flexible support via the EU
budget and the ESM.
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